Introducing eID as a Multi-Facet Innovation

The German Case

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DEXA – EGOV, 31.08.2009, Linz
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eID-Card characteristics

- **Traditional ID-Card functions**

and 3 electronical functions integrated into RFID-Chip:

- **Travel document function** (fingerprints optional)
- **eSignature function** (optional, separated process)
- **eID function** (optional, switch ON/OFF possible)
eID-Card characteristics - eID function

1. Use for eGovernment and eBusiness
2. Certificated identity - not only of the citizen: access only by certified service providers
3. Mutual authentication between ePA-chip and eID-terminal (service provider)
4. eID-Access only with citizen-PIN
5. Separate access rights for each data field
6. Data transfer only via encrypted channel
7. Function for using pseudonym access
8. Age verification without providing date of birth (boolean operation)
Service provider certification

1. Certification request of service provider (eGovernment + eBusiness) at Federal Office of Administration
2. Check of the purpose of the service and the safety specifications
3. Generation of the certificate from service provider PKI and https-certificate
4. Certificate with authorization contents is signated and transferred to the service provider
5. Service provider has now the access to the ePA-data
Description online authentication process – citizen view

1. Citizen connects to service provider via browser/internet
2. Citizen connects the ePA to the contactless reader (connected to user terminal)
3. Service provider sends access certificate with access rights for data fields
4. Citizen selects and confirms the access to each data fields
5. Citizen enters the ePA-PIN (six digit number)
6. Service provider gets the access to data fields
eID-Card/ePA timeline with main factors

- **eSignature phase**
  - 2001: Cabinet Decision (SPD/Grüne) „BundOnline2005“ federal E-Government program
  - 2002: 1.+2. Law eSignature, biometry legally permitted
- **eCard phase**
  - 2003: Founding DIF Industry Forum of technical spezification eID-card
  - 2004: Founding Dep. IT4 (BMI) passport ID-cards registration
- **ePA phase**
  - 2005: ePASS 1. Generation with RFID, biometry (only face image)
  - 2006: Cabinet Decision (SPD/Grüne) „eCard-Strategie“ interoperability federal Card-projects with ePA
  - 2007: Coalition Committee: fingerprints on the ePA, no central storage
  - 2008: Cabinet Decision (CDU/SPD) „E-Government 2.0“ (ePA+eID-concept)
  - 2009: Cabinet Decision Draft Bill ePA
  - 2010: November 2010 rollout ePA

**Main Factors**
- Attacks 11.09.2001
- Parliamentary phase
- Implementation phase
- Agreement between administration + parliamentary groups in government fingerprints optional
- Pilot phase with 30 applications
- Tender for application
- Passing bill ePA
Actor constellation
Technological paths of eID-card

- **2002 Biometry legally permitted**
- Development
- New safety technology
- **Identity card**
- eCard-strategy
- Biometry+RFID
- **Passport**
- ePASS
- **Digital ID-card**
- ePA
- **eHealth-Card 2010**
- **eSignature unsuitable for eID**
- **eSignature-card**
- **Governmental eCards**
- **eID-solutions**
- **eID-Management**
- **Chip cards**
- Smart cards
- **eSignature as eID**
- **Development**
- **Biometry technology**
- **ID-card technology**
Decision-making process biometry

- Anti-terrorism law 2002 legally permitted biometry in passport and identity card
- First realization biometry with ePASS (2005) by EU-regulations and ICAO-standards
- Transfer by eID-Card because of travel document
- Stepped restriction by political actors because of privacy concerns
  - Fingerprint only in the ePA-chip (2007: no central storage)
  - Fingerprint only optional (2008)
Some Conclusions

The following factors are responsible for a fast and mostly conflict-free implementation of the new functions of ePA:

• Core team of experts on administrative/governmental level
• Central competence in governmental institutions (BMI → IT-Group + Dep. IT4, BSI) completed with industrial competence
• Previous technology of ePASS (same Dep. IT4 + BSI) prepared solutions on ePA (RFID, biometry, eID)

Privacy enhancement by eID-technology:
Mutual authentication between citizen (ePA-chip) and service provider (eID-terminal) reduces safety risks like phishing